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1. Introduction 
In the Republic, Plato seems to advocate the banning of most extant poetry, because of its 
corrupting effect on the soul. Aristotle in his Poetics does not have any such qualms. Why the 
difference? I shall suggest that there are identifiable reasons for their divergent views. Central 
among them is that, while Plato asks whether the object of mimesis is kalon, Aristotle focuses 
his attention on whether the production of mimesis is kalon. This allows Aristotle to present 
his views not directly in opposition to Plato’s, but as a reinterpretation of the question. 
Aristotle’s reframing is intimately tied up with his presenting kalon as accessible to us in a 
more intellectual way than what is allowed for in Plato’s Republic, or, indeed, in other works 
by Aristotle himself. 
2. Two central terms: kalon and thumos 
So, first of all, what does it mean to say that something is kalon? Among its more specific 
senses in the tradition down to and including Aristotle, are ‘beautiful’ and ‘functionally 
excellent’. Accordingly, in the Gorgias, for example, “those persons who exhibit a disorderly 
soul cannot perform their function or, therefore, achieve the kalon”.2 Aristotle, furthermore, 
fleshes out to kalon in terms of the characteristics order (taxis),  symmetry (summetria), and 
definiteness (hôrismenon).3 These three are criteria of beauty, and they are criteria of 
functionality as well.4 Having a right view of to kalon affords one what we might call a 
 
1 I am grateful to the editors for their highly constructive questions and criticisms of a previous version of the 
text. I would also like to thank Pierre Destrée for inviting me to present what was eventually to become the 
present chapter at the Aristotle on Aesthetics conference in Louvain-la-Neuve on March 19-20, 2012. 
2 Kelly Rogers, “Aristotle’s Conception of To Kalon”, Ancient Philosophy 13 (1993), 355-71, reprinted in Lloyd 
P. Gerson (ed.), Aristotle: Critical Assessments Vol. 4, London: Routledge, 337-355 (at 339). The citation is 
from Gorgias 503a-504a. 
3 At Metaphysics M.3 (1078a36-1078b1). Cf. EE 1218a21-24; PA 645a23-25; Pol. 1326a29-35; Poet. 1450b34-
37. For further references and a full discussion, cf. Rogers, “Aristotle’s Conception of To Kalon”. 
4 Building on Gabriel Richardson Lear, we can sum up the three by saying that order is the teleological structure 
of the whole, symmetry concerns the properties of the parts taken singly, and definiteness is about the bounds 
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broadly aesthetic access to what reason, or the reasonable person, also sees as teleologically 
good. Reason has its reasons, while something’s being kalon allows us to see what is fitting. 
It should straightaway be noted that ‘beautiful’ and ‘aesthetic’ do not mean ‘pretty’ in this 
context. Paradigms of what is kalon are impressive victories in battle, people displaying 
grandness and nobility, and the well-ordered, awesome canopy of the night sky. What is kalon 
is worthy, admirable, grand, praiseworthy, besides carrying with it the notion of harmony and 
order. There is often honour in what is kalon. Correspondingly, a primary opposite of kalon is 
not simply ‘ugly’, but aischron—what is shameful, disgusting, or degrading, usually with the 
connotations improper, indecorous, unmannerly. So kalon in Plato and Aristotle is often better 
translated as ‘fine’, ‘admirable’, or ‘noble’ than as ‘beautiful’. 
I shall build part of the argument in this chapter on both philosophers’ claim that kalon stands 
in a special relationship to the psychological dimension which they call thumos. To also 
provide something like a characteristic of thumos (often rendered into English as ‘spirit’), it 
should be noted first of all that both Plato and Aristotle seem to treat this as a psychological 
part or faculty in a tripartition which also includes intellect and the appetites. The logistikon, 
the intellective faculty, is reason as a regard for the whole as well as the parts, and with a view 
to the ultimate good. In a harmonious and well-developed individual, intellect rules the other 
two parts. The difference between those two parts—appetite and thumos—can be spelled out 
as follows. While appetites relate directly to objects in the world that the subject desires, 
thumos is at heart always about the subject. If it is appetite that motivates me to take the last 
piece of the cake, I take it because I want the cake. If it is thumos which motivates me, I take 
the piece of cake because I feel I deserve it more than you do, or because I feel it is a nice way 
of getting back at you for having slighted me earlier. 
So while appetite is simply desire for an external object, thumos or spirit is desire that 
involves the agent. If we glance to the Phaedrus for a readily available representation of 
thumos, the noble horse reacts not simply to the object of desire, but to the shamefulness of 
the desire of the appetitive horse. This is an exact parallel to Leontius, the famous 
necrophiliac in Republic book III: his thumos is raging at his own appetites, represented by his 
 
and limits of the whole. Together, these three tell us that what is kalon is also something that seems purposive, in 
the sense of being fitting. Gabriel Richardson Lear, “Moral Virtue and To Kalon” (chapter 6, in Happy Lives and 
the Highest Good: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Princeton University Press, 2004, 123-146), 126-130. A rare 
example of kalôs probably simply meaning “effective” or something similar in the Poetics is 24.1459b11-13. 
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eyes, and not at the corpses.5 So thumos is not only a desire for some thing, but a desire to be 
someone.6 It is an evaluation of someone as being worthy, or unworthy, of admiration and 
emulation. 
A central claim in the next section will be that thumos as a specific module or capacity of the 
soul, as this is depicted in the Republic, is supposed to be trained to respond to what is kalon. 
In this respect, the cake example also brings out a further aspect of thumos. Thumos works 
motivationally in the way it does because it is essentially competitive. Both Plato and 
Aristotle take victory and honour to be primary objects of thumos. What we take to be kalon, 
we experience as a special sort of pleasure. This pleasure is not like that of the mere appetites 
that define the lowest part of the soul. The pleasures of thumos are the pleasures of 
transcending the commonplace, of living up to some ideal, of being, or being witness to, 
greatness. It is all about admiration: wanting to be looked up to, praised, and recognized for 
one’s own fine acts, and looking up to and wishing to emulate someone else or some act of 
theirs. So thumetic esteem is always, at the same time, an expression of self-esteem. Suitably, 
the well-ordered soul according to the Republic is characterized by harmonia and sumphonia, 
and is as such itself kalê (Rep. 430a; cf. 443c-444a). 
3. Art, kalon, and thumos in Plato and Aristotle 
In this section, I shall try to set out the relations between art, thumos, and to kalon in our two 
authors. A central claim in what follows will be that Plato in the Republic, no less than 
Aristotle, sees the issue of what is kalon as central to the shaping of thumos; and vice versa, 
that thumos is the main faculty to be affected by to kalon in a successful upbringing according 
to the Republic’s pedagogical theory. The present chapter’s main argument concerning the 
Poetics, namely, that Aristotle strikingly utilizes the term kalon primarily not for the objects 
of artistic representation, but for the craftsmanship behind the production of such 
representations, is logically independent of this contention. But only purely logically: the two 
are still substantially related, in that they provide us with a vantage point from which to see 
 
5 “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!” (440a) All translations from the 
Republic are by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, as available in John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete 
Works, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1997. 
6 Aristophanes’ comic story of twosomeness in the Symposium takes on extra significance if we see it in the light 




the most dramatic development in the Platonico-Aristotelian corpus as a whole as not a shift 
towards a thumos/kalon correspondence in Aristotle (as a development marking a contrast 
with Plato), but as a shift from a thumos/kalon correspondence shared by both Plato and 
Aristotle generally to an intellectualized notion of to kalon in Aristotle’s dealings with the arts 
in the Poetics.7 
In the case of Aristotle, there is little reason to doubt the broad link between kalon and 
thumos. According to John M. Cooper's explicating translation of a passage from the second 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
there are three objects of choice [ta eis tas haireseis] and three of avoidance: the kalon 
(the noble, fine, beautiful), the advantageous, and the pleasant, and their opposites, the 
aischron [the base, shameful, ugly], the harmful, and the painful. In relation to all 
these the good person gets things right, while the bad person gets things wrong, but 
especially in relation to pleasure.8 
 
In very general terms, the three objects of choice named in this passage form part of a grand 
view of human motivation, human goods, and human development. In the wording of Myles 
Burnyeat, there “are three things to get right […]. Pursuit of pleasure is an inborn part of our 
animal nature; concern for the noble depends on a good upbringing; while the good, here 
specified as the advantageous, is the object of mature reflection.”9 Cooper, in reference to the 
Burnyeat paper, clarifies his agreement as follows. “I am in agreement with Burnyeat in 
seeing that Nic. Eth. 1104b30-36, refers to three ‘irreducibly distinct categories of value’ that 
‘connect each with a distinct set of desires and feelings’.”10 Aristotle is discussing what we 
 
7 As the two are still logically independent, however, the reader who is only interested in Aristotle’s kalon usage 
can skip this section without loss as far as that narrower argument is concerned. 
8 EN II, iii, 1104b30-34, as translated in Cooper, "Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value", 265. 
9 Myles Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good”, 86; the main portion of passage Burnyeat is referring to 
is the one we have just quoted in Cooper's translation, EN II, iii, 1104b30-34. I speculate further on some of 
these implications in “Mimesis in Aristotle’s Ethics”, 73-86 in Andersen & Haarberg (edd.), Making Sense of 
Aristotle: Essays in Poetics (Duckworth, London 2001). 
10 Cooper, “Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value”, 278, n. 38, with quotes from Burnyeat, “Aristotle on 
Learning to Be Good”, 86. Cooper then goes on to mention two points of difference between his own 
interpretation and that of Burnyeat. “If my account differs from his, it is first of all, in the special emphasis I 
place on the spirited desires as becoming focused, through habituation, on the noble or fine in action, and on the 
subsequent pleasure that is taken in their satisfaction through that kind of action. Secondly, I emphasise, as 




might call different sources of motivation for an agent.11 To begin with, humans come into 
existence equipped with an ability to respond to their surroundings in terms of pleasure and 
pain (hêdonê kai lupê). Ethical development then implies acquiring a notion of the noble or 
fine (to kalon). Finally, the perfection of the agent's goodness means that he or she comes to 
possess a conception of the good (to agathon), sometimes interchangeably rendered by 
Aristotle as the advantageous (to sumpheron).12 
 
To bring out that Aristotle thinks art broadly construed is crucial for forming us, we need only 
glance at the last two books of his Politics. An example of what can have a detrimental effect 
on children, is the stories they hear, as all such exposition prepares the way for their later 
pursuits. And the main dimension of the ethical shaping concerns steering the children away 
from what is shameful. According to Aristotle, “[t]he legislator should altogether outlaw 
shameful talk from the city state, as he would any other shameful thing, since by speaking 
lightly of a shameful activity one comes closer to doing it. He should particularly outlaw it 
among children, so that they neither say nor hear anything of the sort.”13 And—still 
unambiguously with the children in mind—since shameful talk is outlawed, “it is evident that 
we should also outlaw looking at unseemly pictures or stories” (ib., b13f). In the same vein is 
his advice to minimise contact with slaves in order to avoid the “taint of servility” (ib., b2f). 
 
In proffering his message as to what the child should be allowed to see and hear as 
preparation, Aristotle in all likelihood does not primarily think of stories about weaving for 
weavers, or about pottery for potters, and not only because the children he is theoretically 
 
11 Likewise, eudaimonia, the zenith of human realisation, unites in itself all three; it “is best, finest, and most 
pleasant, and these three features are not distinguished in the way suggested by the Delian inscription” (EN I, 
viii, 1099a24f). According to the Delian inscription, the basis of which is contested by Aristotle, “What is most 
just is finest; being healthy is most beneficial; but it is most pleasant to win our heart's desire” (ib., 27f; 
translations from the EN are by Terence Irwin, unless otherwise specified). 
12 Cf. Cooper: “‘The advantageous’ [to sumpheron], in short, is a stand-in here for ‘the good’ (to agathon)” (ib, 
265f). In a note, Cooper goes on to comment that the equation in this context probably has its roots in the fact 
that an action chosen as good is generally so chosen with a view to a greater whole or context than just the single 
act seen in isolation (ib., n. 22). In general, I would like to add, the good may be interpreted not so much as an 
extra item to aim at, as a new way of aiming at to kalon; what is new is primarily that the noble is now also seen 
via a view of the whole into which it fits. 
13 Politics VII, xvii, 1336b3-8; C.D.C. Reeve’s translation. The statement about the effects of stories children 
hear is at 1336a30-34. (Cf. Plato's Republic III, 401b-d, where the impact of symbols, traces, or likenesses of 




providing for are not artisans but Greek freemen; rather, the settings must only be close 
enough for the child imaginatively to start creating a vision of the great or noble (that is, 
ultimately, the good) man. Similarly, children must be taught drawing not because it is useful 
in any narrow way, “but rather because it makes them contemplate the beauty of bodies” (to 
peri ta sômata kallous, Pol. VIII.1338b1-2). This also means that certain parts of Homer, for 
instance, might be excellent for inspiring courage and justice, although their purely instructive 
value is limited—the weapons are different in Aristotle's time, and war only an extreme 
expression of civic virtue. The need for protection from the wrong impressions stems 
primarily from the fact that the bad or lowly make their mark on one before one realises what 
they are, or what they are signs of, or what they lead to or go along with. As much as 
providing the right models, or the right advice, or the right associations, steering in 
habituation will be a limiting of what is available. This is part of the basis for Aristotle’s 
claim, also in Politics VIII, that 
everyone who listens to representations [tôn mimêseôn] comes to have similar 
emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies of those representations. And 
since it so happens that music is one of the pleasures, and virtue has to do with 
enjoying, loving, and hating in the right way, obviously one must learn and become 
accustomed to nothing so much as correctly judging and enjoying decent characters 
and noble actions. In rhythms and melodies there is the greatest likeness to the true 
natures of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, all of their 
opposites, and the other characters. (Politics VIII.1340a12-21) 
There is no doubt in Aristotle either that a sensitivisation to what is kalon happens through an 
activation and shaping of our thumetic qualities, or that art is paramount in this process. 
But we need to contextualize this insight in order to see how what Aristotle then does in the 
Poetics might relate to his main interlocutor, Plato. And the claim that thumos14 relates to the 
dimension of the kalon and the aischron in the case of Plato is not universally accepted 
among scholars.15 I will try to indicate the correctness of this claim by pointing out how the 
 
14 The part is often in Plato called thumoeidês. 
15 John Cooper has argued that Aristotle invents in saying thumos aims at to kalon, while Gabriel Richardson 
Lear suggests that this is clear in Plato as well: cf. Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), esp. Chapter 6, “Moral Virtue and to kalon” (123-146), note 36 at 
139; John M. Cooper, “Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value”, 253-280 in Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 
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education in music and poetry in the ideal city is designed to make the guardians’ thumos able 
to recognize and value to kalon. 
According to the social design of the Republic, the guardians are to be trained with poetry and 
music, including stories, even before physical training (II.376de). As Socrates says, this is the 
most important part of the training, since here, a pattern is established in their souls.16 
Especially while people are young, the soul is extremely malleable. The degree to which one 
can shape young souls is, for better or worse, extreme, so that “they will shape their children’s 
souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by handling them” (377c). For this 
reason, the stories to which the young are exposed must be kaloi. This is the one and only 
criterion for which stories should be told: “We’ll select their stories whenever they are fine or 
beautiful and reject them when they aren’t” (ib.). So here, we already have an indication that 
early cultural input is seen as contributing to attuning the young vis-à-vis what is kalon.17 
The requirement of the stories’ being kaloi applies even to such a degree that what is correctly 
described as truths and falsehoods about the gods is to a certain extent cashed out in terms of 
what is kalon and what is not. The very notion of truth seems at times to be considered 
primarily in terms of impact with regard to the kalon. It is in this sense that “telling the 
greatest falsehood about the most important things doesn’t make a fine story [ho eipôn kalôs]” 
(377e). According to a related passage, “even if it [the story in question] were true, it should 
be passed over in silence” (378a) and not told to the young. What is at issue is not primarily 
literal truth as we moderns tend to think of it, but developing an optimal use of stories and of 
history (repeated at 383d), with kalon as the ruling criterion.18 
A striking use of the “kalon over truth”-methodology, if we can call it that, is “the noble lie” 
(414b ff.), which robs the citizens of any insight into their actual identities. Correspondingly, 
all stories that portray the gods—objects of fascination and admiration—as “warring, plotting, 
 
Princeton: Princeton University Press (1999), at 263. Cooper argues that thumos according to the Republic aims 
only at timê. 
16 The Greek term translated as ‘pattern’ is tupos. In most of Socrates’ analysis, the word occurs in the plural. 
17 While the final tripartition happens in book IV, the material we are presently considering is in books II and III. 
We should presume, however, that its author took seriously the tripartition to come, and tailored the pedagogical 
treatment in the earlier books to it. 
18 Cf. III.389b, where falsehood is termed useful as a sort of drug. An explicit instance of the application of the 




or warring against one another” (378bc) are banned for the reason that such acts should be 
seen by the citizens as shameful (aischiston, 378bc). Similarly, gods cannot be represented as 
changing, not least because this would mean changing themselves not into “something better 
and more beautiful [kallion]”, but something “worse and uglier [or more shameful—
aischion]” (381b). The weight throughout these passages is unambiguously on the kalon, 
more than on the agathon, as the object of representation and appreciation. The auxiliaries’ 
education is not least supposed to make them love to kalon (403c). This happens to a great 
extent through poetry and music, that is, art (401d-402a). 
As already mentioned, policy choices relating to the arts in books II and III are characterized 
in terms of their effects on psychological patterns, tupoi. The very fact that the means for 
shaping the young are patterns, and not arguments, is significant, because it tells us that the 
soul shaping does not relate directly to to logistikon, whose characteristic is its ability to 
calculate with a view to the good as a whole. As already indicated, the various choices 
concerning material culture, stories, and practices throughout these books are set out in terms 
of what is kalon (episodes depicting courage and moderation) and what is aischron (episodes 
depicting horror or lewdness or impiety or hubristic aggression). 
Crucially, this non-intellectualist, self-regarding economy of shame and pride clearly points 
forward to the tripartition to follow in the text of the Republic. It is on this background we 
should consider as well the claim that the well turned-out man will be ashamed 
(aischuneisthai, III.396d) to imitate, in the narrow sense of enactment, anything that belongs 
to worse patterns. That the discussion after this (from 398c), moves on to consider modes and 
varieties of music only confirms the focus on to kalon—for instance, music imitates the tone 
of voice of someone moderate and courageous (399bc). More generally, the proper education 
in music and poetry is supposed to render the person graceful, euschêmôn (401de). 
That this is a shaping of thumos rather than of reason in any more direct sense is also brought 
out by the fact that such coming to love what is noble paves the way for reason’s later entry: 
“He’ll rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he’s still young and unable to grasp 
the reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes 
and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself.” (III.401e-402a) It is then 
explicitly stated in the text that this is the very reason for providing education in music and 
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poetry (ib.). That is to say, the education in music and poetry “ought to end in love of the fine 
and beautiful” (dei de pou teleutan ta mousika eis ta tou kalou erotika, 403c). 
Considering the distinction between physical training and training of the soul makes the 
kalon-focus of the latter even more evident. The focus on what is kalon is almost exclusively 
seen as modifiable by music and poetry right to the end of book II (385c). Only in book III 
does courage, which has often been thought to be the only function of a well-turned-out 
thumos in Plato’s Republic, come importantly into focus.19 The relevance of to kalon to 
courage is, among other things, that physical training unaccompanied by music and poetry 
makes people more savage than they should be (410b-d). Someone with only physical training 
and no musical training will be full of spirit, but he will hate philosophy and music, and act 
like a savage with no grace (411de).20 We can thus see one reason why the thumos/kalon 
relation is so important in the Republic. This is about what one aspires to be, and negatively 
about what one would be ashamed to be, depending on what sort of ideals are present in a 
culture. 
4. The acknowledgement of ethical risk in shaping thumos 
To take a more synoptic view, Plato and Aristotle also seem to agree on the following. Every 
burst of reaction from my thumos is available to me on the experiential level, as an integral 
part of what thumos is. This is always an emotive reaction to something, which is at the same 
time an expression of how I perceive myself and my own worth. But, on another level, every 
thymetic eruption is also a contribution to shaping and developing thumos itself. It is as if 
thumos is rehearsing a script, with me in a main role. As clearly indicated by the 
characterizations in terms of tupoi, the problem is that thumos does not have the capacity to 
 
19 And even here, appreciating to kalon relates to courage in that courage is the most extreme motivational job to 
kalon must do for the young guardians. Here, ugly is shameful, and beautiful is noble. 
20 The cultivating part is called ‘philosophical’ at 410de. The denomination ‘philosophical’ here means that the 
education in question provides cultivation more generally. (As said, at this point the text is still about the 
guardians, and the main psychological division has yet to be made.)  –In the summary at III.410e-411b, the result 
of the educative process is a harmony between the two parts that render the individual both moderate and 
courageous. One might think this means that the parts in question are appetite and thumos, respectively. 
However, if harmony is not reached, the individual is cowardly and savage, both of which are thumoeidetic 
qualities. And at 411ab, it is the spirited part that is melted and dissolved by sweet, soft, and plaintive musical 
tunes from a flute. Thumos is conceived as directed towards what it supposes to be noble, harmonious, and just 
throughout the Republic (cf., e.g., IV.439e-440d), but spirit that lacks the required music-and-poetry education 




transform the innumerable episodes into anything like one consistent script. Thumos, in this 
sense, is local. 
Only a proper upbringing can help us form the right sort of notions of what is fine and what is 
shameful. A successful upbringing is, perhaps more than anything else, an attunement and 
development of thumos to make us see what is fine and noble, and shun what is shameful and 
disgraceful.21 This is the import of Plato’s saying, echoed by Aristotle, that it is all-important 
to get into the right habits right from early youth. The right habituation is most of all about 
shaping our motivational settings, and giving us a desire for to kalon. 
The kalon seems to fulfil a purpose or design. But in itself, it needn’t actually be purposive; 
not least, the kalon-motivated agent needn’t understand how it is purposive. The fine soldier 
in this minimal sense doesn’t have to know in detail what the war is fought for, for example. 
The psychological economy of the perfect agent is such that reason and thumos are in 
alignment: only that which is judged by reason to be good is seen by thumos as being 
beautiful or fine. On the other hand, for people who are on the right track, but not yet fully 
developed as rational beings, a well-shaped thumos will generally let them react in the right 
way to situations and options by seeing them in this more ‘aesthetic’ manner. 
In this connection, however, it is crucial to realize that we can be mistaken about to kalon.22 
Nothing guarantees a well-shaped thumos. The admired object of thumos is what the agent or 
person thinks or experiences as fine and beautiful. And one can be very wrong about what is 
in fact fine and beautiful. In such cases, thumos can for instance make one react to insults that 
are not really insults, or it makes one overreact or underreact in an unseemly manner. More 
dramatically, one can even be so ethically degenerate that one systematically sees as fine and 
great what is in fact disgusting or even horrendous.23 
That we can be mistaken about to kalon here also means that we can be mis-shaped in a 
process where evil accumulates in the soul without our being aware of it.24 That is to say: we 
 
21 For evidence of the corresponding contention in Aristotle, cf. EN IV.9.1128b15-19. 
22 Cf., e.g., Rep. 378b-e. This is probably one reason why the Republic’s interlocutors agree that “everything fine 
is difficult” (chalepa ta kala, 435c). 
23 As an example, imagine groups of thugs who actually think they are wonderful and admirable in beating up 
innocent single individuals. 
24 The Republic’s guardians represent thumos, and are accordingly shaped by what I have called aesthetic means: 
art, imitations, images. If the images are fine and noble, the guardians are led unwittingly to the beauty of reason. 
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are designed in such a way that our ethical shaping through thumos happens by a piecemeal 
process. And, this is a process that we don’t even know is going on. In sum, the practical 
process of hooking thumos up with to kalon implies serious ethical risk for the individual. 
Given this broad agreement between the two thinkers, the question now becomes, what is 
happening in the Poetics? As we shall see, Aristotle in this work alters the framework for his 
discourse (the rules of engagement, one might say) in a way which minimizes ethical risk for 
the poetic sphere. 
5. Aristotle’s reframing of kalon 
When we turn to the Poetics, we find a striking change of perspective on Aristotle’s part. 
While Aristotle still, like Plato, evaluates extant art in terms of whether it is kalon, when it 
comes to the evaluation of art, thumos and what is kalon are no longer aligned. I will argue 
that, while the direct effect of art according to both Plato and the Aristotle of the Politics is 
primarily its effect on thumos, the effect is a more complex and intellectual one on Aristotle’s 
account in the Poetics.25 
I first want to emphasize that my claim concerning the Poetics’ usage is not meant to deny the 
role of a reasonably well-shaped thumos, as part of one’s character, as a prerequisite for 
experiencing and judging art works like tragedies according to that same work. In the Poetics, 
an emphasis on character is evident already from Aristotle’s partial definition of tragedy in 
terms of it being about people “better than us”. To Aristotle, there is no understanding of 
practical matters apart from character. Whether inside or outside drama, it is not possible to 
grasp a good character, or a bad character as bad, if one has not had a taste of to kalon.26 This 
means that, in order to understand and judge the mimesis in question, you must have a thumos 
that is relatively well-shaped and virtuously integrated. Someone like ho deinos, the person 
who is good at calculating but lacks a view of the good, will not be able to get the proper 
pleasure out of a tragedy because he does not sufficiently recognize the object of the mimesis. 
 
If they are “images of evil […], the guardians will “little by little […] unwittingly accumulate a large evil in their 
souls” (Rep. III, 401b-d). ‘Unwittingly’ translates lanthane(i). 
25 One caveat is in order. I sometimes speak of tragedy, sometimes more generally about poetry or even more 
generally about art. Although the sources usually speak about a specific genre, my use of the wider 
denominations indicates that I take the texts to be intended to apply equally widely. Those who do not concur, 
can simply substitute the species for the genus in the relevant passages. 
26 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics X, ix, 1179b19-20. 
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Aristotle reveals his view of character as central, not only to watching or reading, but to 
producing mimeseis, in his account of the origin of comedy and tragedy. 
Poetry branched into two, according to its creators’ characters [kata ta oikeia ethê]: 
the more serious [semnoteroi] produced mimesis of noble [kalas] actions and the 
actions of noble people, while the more vulgar [eutelesteroi] depicted the actions of 
the base [tôn phaulôn], in the first place by composing invectives (just as the others 
produced hymns and encomia).27 
It may look strange to us that Aristotle places the sort of weight he does on character in his 
Poetics, even defining the basic genres in terms of something that would seem to be external 
to the craft because it belongs to the object being depicted and not to the craft as such. But to 
Aristotle, character’s being part of the object does not mean that it does not also form part of 
the demands on the artist. Tragedy, like comedy, is to Aristotle radically character-driven in 
that the author’s character remains a source of the mimesis. This does not mean that the 
author has to be perfectly good, and it certainly does not mean that he has to have the sort of 
desires or plans that his characters do. But it does mean that he has to be acquainted with what 
is kalon in life: he must be someone who sees the world as a place for the admirable and the 
beautiful, for greatness and nobility. Only thus can he realize what it means when a given 
desire or plan aimed at its realization is thwarted, or what it means to such a person to find 
herself with a desire or plan which is evil or shameful. In fact, only then can he recognize that 
someone finds herself with such a desire or plan. 
Strikingly, however, the passage quoted above is a rare bird in the Poetics.28 In 
contradistinction to what he does in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Politics, Aristotle 
generally does not in this work utilize kalon and its cognates to characterize the objects of 
mimesis. In the two places where he discusses the ethical qualities of the objects of mimesis, 
chapters 2 (1447b29-1448a5) and 13 (1452b30-1453a10), Aristotle uses a wide variety of 
terms known from the Ethics. An individual seen as object of mimesis is elevated 
(spoudaios), base (phaulos), superior (chreissôn), better (beltiôn) or inferior (cheirôn), and 
has vice (kakia) or virtue (arête) (all ch. 2). He can be decent (epieikês) or depraved 
 
27 Poet. 4.1448b23-27; all translations from the Poetics are from Stephen Halliwell’s Loeb translation. 
28 One instance of the comparative kalliôs is found at 15.1454b8-9, characterizing how good painters make 
people more beautiful. Likewise, the colours at 6.1450a39-b2 are perhaps described as kallistoi as such, although 
they have been applied by a painter. 
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(mochthêros), he can be very wicked (sphodra ponêros) or someone not preeminent in virtue 
or justice (ho mête arête(i) diapherôn kai dikaiosunê(i)) (all ch. 13). But the object of mimesis 
is generally not said to be kalos, or to instantiate to kalon. 
However, this is not to say that Aristotle does not avail himself of kalon-terminology in the 
Poetics. Far from it, the text abounds in such talk. But remarkably, Aristotle reserves it for 
characterizing the artist’s work: the crafting itself, and the artists’ products qua products. The 
following three passages seem to me to provide clear instances of the former. Significantly, 
first among them is the initial declaration of the purpose of the Poetics, its opening words. 
We are to discuss both poetry in general and the capacity of each of its genres; the 
canons of plot construction needed for poetic excellence [ei mellei kalôs echein hê 
poiêsis] […] (Poet. 1.1447a6-9) 
Homer, in keeping with his general superiority, evidently grasped well, whether by art 
or by nature, this point too [kai tout’ eoiken kalôs idein, êtoi dia technên ê dia phusin] 
(i.e., that a plot is not unified if built around an individual, but by structuring it around 
a unitary action) (Poet. 9.1451a22-24) 
[…] the poet should be inventive as well as making good use of (chrêsthai kalôs) 
traditional stories. Let me explain more clearly what I mean by ‘good use’ (kalôs). 
(Poet. 14.1453b24-26) 
What is kalon in all three instances is the act of making—the craft of composing—art. (It thus 
only makes sense that we encounter the adverb in place of the adjective.) It is not the model or 
object of mimesis which is kalon, but the artist’s competence in composing a unity from the 
material. Distillation into a unified whole is here what is kalôs according to Aristotle. 
The first instance quoted here, the Poetics’ opening lines, tells us that the agenda for the work 
is to uncover what is required in order for the poet’s constructive activity to be kalon. Being 
kalon is thus here unequivocally taken as a status or standard for poetic activity, not for what 
is portrayed or even for the product considered in isolation. Similarly, the quoted chapter 9 
usage displays the adverbial form being applied to the poet over all poets, Homer, thus 
forging a link from the general activity to the particular poet. The normative weight of the 
term is perhaps even clearer in the chapter 14 instance, where Aristotle applies the adverbial 
form of kalon to specifics of how the poet should go about his business. Immediately 
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following the quote, Aristotle goes on to detail and evaluate the possible varieties in terms of 
the agent’s knowing or not knowing what (s)he is doing as well as the action’s being carried 
out or not—both central examples of choices in the poet’s construction of plot structures.  
The majority of kalon tokens in the Poetics can be seen to follow this paradigm. Most often, 
the term is used to commend poetic structures that are artfully structured or unified. The 
following are related passages with explicit use of kalon. 
• 7.1451a9-11: it is stressed that magnitude is a requirement for being kalliôn. In further 
commenting on this stricture, Aristotle is careful to point out that the criterion cannot 
refer simply to water clocks (rules of competition) or a given audience’s limited 
resources (powers of attention), but must first of all concern the nature of the matter, 
as this is intrinsic to the art. 
• 11.1452a31-32: the kallistê recognition occurs simultaneously with reversal. This too 
is obviously a feature that concerns the structure—or structuring—of the events and 
thus the poet’s product qua the poet’s product, not a reference to, e.g., which real-life 
models might be most suitable. 
• 13.1452b30-31: the structure (sunthesis) of the kallistê tragedy is complex. This refers 
back to the definition in chapter 10 of a complex plot as one with recognition and/or 
reversal. 
• 13.1453a22-23: summary of specifics kata tên technên (character, change to adversity, 
cause in error, single plot) of which structure makes for the kallistê tragedy (cf. ib., 
1453a19). As for all the kalon instances in this group, this concerns specific qualities 
or features of the product, but seen as a result of the process of composition, as was 
announced as his topic in the beginning of the work and remains the focus of 
Aristotle’s interest. 
A rare instance of kalon as merely what has an effect (the inclusion of loan words and similar 
ploys to create an out of the ordinary impression), seemingly without regard to any greater 
structure, is 22.1458b18-21. More typically, however, Aristotle has something to say about 
what makes the kalê structures and plots kalê, beyond the fact that they are unified. They are 




A whole is that which has a beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which 
does not itself follow necessarily from something else, but after which a further 
event or process naturally occurs. And end, by contrast, is that which itself naturally 
occurs, whether necessarily or usually, after a preceding event, but need not be 
followed by anything else. A middle is that which both follows a preceding event 
and has further consequences. Well-constructed plots, therefore, should neither 
begin nor end at an arbitrary point, but should make use of the patterns stated. 
Besides, a beautiful [kalon] object, whether an animal or anything else with a 
structure of parts, should have not only its parts ordered but also an appropriate 
magnitude: beauty consists in magnitude and order, which is why there could not be 
a beautiful animal which was either minuscule (as contemplation of it, occurring in 
an almost imperceptible moment, has no distinctness) or gigantic (as contemplation 
of it has no cohesion, but those who contemplate it lose a sense of unity and 
wholeness), say an animal a thousand miles long. So just as with our bodies and with 
animals beauty requires magnitude, but magnitude that allows coherent perception, 
likewise plots require length, but length that can be coherently remembered. (Poet. 
7.1450b25-1451a6) 
No doubt, the requirement that a whole is something with nothing outside it from which it 
follows, or nothing to which it leads, with necessity or likeliness, is also a cognitive demand. 
Thus, that a kalon plot is one tailored to our understanding is also brought forth by Aristotle’s 
claim at 9.1452a9-10 that plots which manage to make the events seem to stem from design 
(as when Mitys’ statue killed his murderer) are more kalon. 29 
Aristotle takes the artist’s activity and product to be kalon in being ideally suited to create a 
special form of cognitive experience in the spectator or reader. This is the experience of 
realizing that one is confronted with a unified structure of the appropriate kind. In tragedy, the 
ideal form the experience takes is when the unity of the plot dawns upon one, the moment 
when all the parts that have been set forth one by one are suddenly grasped as parts.30 
 
29 That “beauty consists in magnitude and order” too reminds us that we should not think of the passage as 
dealing with kalon as “beautiful” in a sense cut off from what was established in our discussion above of kalon 
as ‘noble’. 
30 A seemingly unique use is found in chapter 25. “When the question is whether someone has spoken or acted 
well [peri de tou kalôs ê mê kalôs ei eirêtai tini ê pepraktai], one should examine not only whether the actual 
deed or utterance is good or bad, but also the identity of the agent or speaker, to whom he acted or spoke, when, 
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It does not seem likely that the Poetics’ striking usage of the term kalon and its cognates are a 
mere coincidence. We know that Aristotle treated the text of the Republic as an articulation of 
Plato’s views, and we know that he agreed with Plato’s general notion of thumos as the aspect 
of our moral psychological setup which can be trained to recognize and value to kalon as the 
bedrock for ethical development and motivation. Taking this into account, a not unlikely 
interpretation of his surprising, and surprisingly consistent, usage in the Poetics is that it 
constitutes a response, if not a reply, to what Aristotle takes to be Plato’s worries. While Plato 
focuses primarily on the effects on the audience, Aristotle dedicates the main bulk of his 
treatment to the issue of the poetry being well-crafted, and ultimately to the crafting itself. 
This means that firstly, Aristotle shifts the focus away from the audience; and secondly, while 
very much delving on both producer and product, the Poetics gives a priority to the poet’s 
activity. For even though the product is the end and the production is a means to that end, the 
product’s quality of being kalon constitutes an indication of the nature of the productive 
process more than anything else. Mastering a craft means being able to construct the 
appropriate product, and it is this very mastery or competence that yields the relevant quality. 
That is to say, what is primarily kalon about poetry is the successful making of it, while the 
product is derivatively kalon by being well made. 
This is not something that can be proven, of course. But even without speculating about its 
author’s intentions, we can conclude that Aristotle’s usage in the Poetics contributes to a 
drastic reframing of the question of how to evaluate and judge art. The one big worry in the 
Republic had been that the things actually portrayed through mimesis lead to a destructive 
fragmentation of the soul. The single most dramatic innovation from the Republic—and 
Politics—to the Poetics is a shift in focus to the craft of portraying. And this shift allows 
Aristotle to argue that art offers not a source of fragmentation, but of unity. 
 
with what means, and for what end—namely, whether to occasion greater good, or avert greater evil.” 
(25.1461a3-8) Here, as acknowledged at the start of the present section, we see how criteria well-known from 
the Ethics play an integral role in judging whether something is kalon in a tragedy. Presumably, the thought is 
that, in order to be able to judge whether something has been well said by a character in the tragedy, we need to 
consider the whole context of the utterance. And in considering this context, we apply a regard for the whole 
which is like the one we must apply in order to judge well, or act well, in a practical setting. This does nothing to 
undermine the claim that kalon is used to characterize the work of art as well composed in the sense of being 
successfully designed for grasping by a discerning audience. 
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6. Aristotle’s reevaluation of the audience 
It is a rather drastic measure on Aristotle’s part to set up the poet’s perspective as a new focal 
point, both generally when it comes to poetry, and specifically when it comes to judgments in 
terms of what is kalon. As a pendant to this drastic measure, Aristotle also changes the 
corresponding notion of the audience. The author perspective allows him to demand a certain 
form of competence on their part to match that of the author. Most important among these 
innovations is Aristotle’s well-known claim that, in order to enjoy the pleasure proper to 
representational art, you have to be familiar with the relevant models. In order to recognize 
the product, you must have seen the original. And as far as the representation of ethical 
matters is concerned, to love them is to know them: the correct appreciation of characters 
better than us, and of what happens to them, requires decency on the part of the recipient. 
Without this experience and insight, you are simply not in a position to judge properly the 
qualities of the work of art, and will be stuck admiring it as just so many fragments of 
spectacle without reference. With it, on the other hand, you don’t even need the trimmings 
afforded by staging.31 
This is a far cry from the picture invoked by Plato in his Symposion. At the drinking party, 
which takes place the night after Agathon has won a victory for his tragedy at the festival, 
Socrates turns to him and cries: 
“Agathon! […] How forgetful do you think I am? I saw how brave and dignified you 
were when you walked right up to the theater platform along with the actors and 
looked straight out at that enormous audience. You were about to put your own 
writing on display, and you weren’t the least bit panicked. After seeing that, how 
could I expect you to be flustered by us, when we are so few?” “Why Socrates”, said 
Agathon, “you must think I have nothing but theater audiences on my mind! So you 
suppose I don’t realize that, if you’re intelligent, you find a few sensible men much 
more frightening than a senseless crowd?” (Symposion 194a-b) 
 
31 For Aristotle’s exclusion of opsis (‘spectacle’, including staging) from being part of the poet’s art or necessary 
to the fulfilment of poetry’s function, cf. Poet. 6.1450b15-20; 14.1453b1-8; 26.1462a11-13. 
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This exchange constitutes a rather dramatic take on how the masses rule the day at the theatre. 
In this very elegant display of an elitist perspective, Socrates even pokes fun at Agathon for 
partaking in, and setting himself up to be judged in, such a populist setting.32 
To very briefly recapitulate the two philosophers’ paradigmatic art recipients, then, Plato’s 
audience is a mass of people, some of them very young, corrupted (without even realizing it) 
on a psychological level below the threshold of rational or even conscious processing. In his 
properly ethical writings, Aristotle seems to share this vision. But when we turn to the 
Poetics, the paradigmatic recipient is the experienced and decent reader, grasping at the same 
time both the representation’s link to its real-life model and its inherent qualities as a unified 
whole. 
What could explain this difference in presumed audience? It is possible that its basis is a 
philosophical one, such as a difference in their psychological theories. Aristotle might have 
allowed for other cognitive abilities among cultivated and mature individuals than did Plato. 
But at least when it comes to the young and the many, Aristotle is as adamant as Plato’s 
dramatis personae about the critical psychological impact of art, and we have no direct 
indication that the two thinkers should differ drastically in their evaluation of the relevant 
cognitive abilities of the well brought up. 
Part of the explanation might also be historical. Although new tragedies continued to be 
churned out well into the 2nd century AD, the acknowledged greats belonged to the 5th century 
BC. And it may be that already in Aristotle’s time, something about the reception of tragedy 
had changed. In Plato, it is always taken for granted that tragedy works through being staged 
at festivals. The Republic, the Symposion, and the Laws testify to tragedy as primarily 
encountered in its realization on stage. And as is clearly demonstrated by the exchange 
between Socrates and Agathon in the Symposion, quoted above, these occasions are seen as 
boisterous, popular, even vulgar events. At the same time, the passage indicates that even the 
elitist group in question normally depended on being present there as their source for knowing 
about the play’s qualities. As Socrates says, “we were at the theater too, you know, part of the 
ordinary crowd” (194c). 
 
32 As readers of Plato, we know that his Socrates doesn’t give a toss about the masses’ opinions as they can be 
gauged from rallies. The only test worthy of the name is a test between individuals. 
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Aristotle, by contrast, stresses how one gets all the relevant material out of a tragedy by 
treating it as text—that is, by reading it. And his very definition, and discussion, demarcates 
what a tragedy is by distinguishing its essence from all the stuff that can be added on stage as 
part of the dramatization. To Aristotle, the important tragedies are in a way already 
documents from an age gone by. Perhaps they, in his eyes, are so to a greater extent than they 
are integral parts of cultural training and weaving of the social web.33 This would at any rate 
help explain why Aristotle, while he is as adamant as Plato’s dramatis personae about the 
critical psychological impact of art on the young, allows himself to professionalize and 
perhaps even ‘aesthisize’ the experience of tragedy in the Poetics. 
* 
I submit that Aristotle managed to respond to Plato’s challenge by drastically reframing the 
question of art experience. By means of that same reframing, he reminds us that it can be part 
of the artist’s job to surprise, and to surprise in a particular way: through intellectual 
satisfaction, so that even elements that at first seemed jarring are tentatively integrated into 
one’s experience. Aristotle thus produced an analysis which is still unsurpassed of how we in 
one complex epiphany can judge the artist, the work, and ethical goodness. 
 
33 This is not simply to say that Plato was closer in time to the historical events. It is also to say that, as is 
evidenced by most of Plato’s dialogues, his work amounts to an incantation of a past world. It has often been 
stressed how Plato makes the bulk of his writings into a way of making Socrates present (whether his own or 
history’s). No less striking, however, is the fact that much of his oeuvre is also a way of bringing back remnants 
of the lost world of Athens—people and kinds of people—as it was before the end of the Peloponnesian war. 
Tragedy was part of this world, and as such a part of this wider object of love, on one level, and hate, on another 
level, in the dialogues. To Aristotle, they have become an object of study. 
